We show unconditionally that the existence of commitment schemes implies the existence of constant-round nonmalleable commitments; earlier protocols required additional assumptions such as collision-resistant hash functions or subexponential one-way functions.
INTRODUCTION
Commitment schemes are one of the most fundamental cryptographic building blocks. Often described as the "digital" analogue of sealed envelopes, commitment schemes enable a sender to commit itself to a value while keeping it secret from the receiver. This property is called hiding. Furthermore, the commitment is binding, and thus in a later stage when the commitment is opened, it is guaranteed that the "opening" can yield only a single value determined in the committing stage. Their applications range from coin flipping [Blum 1983 ] to the secure computation of any efficiently computable function [Goldreich et al. 1991 [Goldreich et al. , 1987 . In light of their importance, commitment schemes have received a considerable amount of attention. This has resulted in a fairly comprehensive understanding of the hardness assumptions under which they can be realized; in particular, by the results of Naor [1991] and Håstad et al. [1999] , the existence of one-way functions implies the existence of two-round commitments.
For many applications, however, the most basic security guarantees of commitments are not sufficient. For instance, the basic definition of commitments does not rule out an attack where an adversary, upon seeing a commitment to a specific value v, is able to commit to a related value (say, v − 1), even though it does not know the actual value of v. This kind of attack might have devastating consequences if the underlying application relies on the independence of committed values (e.g., consider a case in which the commitment scheme is used for securely implementing a contract bidding mechanism). Indeed, for the general task of secure multi party computation [Goldreich et al. 1987 ], such independence is crucial. The state of affairs is even worsened by the fact that many of the known commitment schemes are actually susceptible to this kind of attack. In order to address these concerns, Dolev, Dwork and Naor (DDN) introduced the concept of nonmalleable commitments [Dolev et al. 2000] . Loosely speaking, a commitment scheme is said to be nonmalleable if it is infeasible for an adversary to "maul" a commitment to a value v into a commitment to a related valueṽ.
More precisely, we consider a man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacker that participates in two concurrent execution of a commitment scheme C, R ; in the "left" execution it interacts with an honest committer (running C); in the "right" execution it interacts with an honest receiver (running R). Additionally, we assume that the players have n-bit identities (where n is polynomially related to the security parameter), and that the commitment protocol depends only on the identity of the committer; we sometimes refer to this as the identity of the interaction. Intuitively, C, R being nonmalleable means that if the identity of the right interaction is different than the identity of the left interaction (i.e., A does not use the same identity as the left committer), the value A commits to on the right does not depend on the value it receives a commitment to on the left; this is formalized by requiring that for any two values v 1 , v 2 , the values A commits to after receiving left commitments to v 1 or v 2 are indistinguishable.
The first nonmalleable commitment protocol was constructed by Dolev, Dwork and Naor in 1991 [Dolev et al. 2000] . The security of their protocol relies on the minimal assumption of one-way functions and requires (log n) rounds of interaction, where n ∈ N is the length of party identities. Nonmalleable commitments have since been extensively studied in the literature; the main question has been to determine the number of communication rounds needed for nonmalleable commitments. Let us briefly survey some of this literature.
The State of the Art of Nonmalleable Commitments
As mentioned, the original work by DDN assumes only one-way functions, and considers the "plain" model of execution; that is, there is no trusted infrastructure. Di Crenenzo et al. [2001b] and follow-up works in, for example, Di Crescenzo et al. [2001a] , Canetti and Fischlin [2001] , Fischlin and Fischlin [2009] , and Damgård and Groth [2003] showed how to improve the round-complexity of the DDN construction when assuming the existence of some trusted infrastructure (e.g., a common random string); in such models noninteractive (i.e., single message) nonmalleable commitments based on only one-way function are known [Damgård and Groth 2003 ]. The first improvement to the round-complexity of the DDN construction without any trusted infrastructure came more than a decade later. Following the ground-breaking work by Barak [2001] on non-black-box simulation, Barak [2002] presented a constant-round protocol for nonmalleable commitments; the security of this protocol however relies on the existence of trapdoor permutations and hash functions that are collision-resistant against circuits of subexponential size. A few years later, Pass and Rosen [2005b] (relying on a technique from Pass [2004] ), showed that collision resistant hash functions secure against polynomially sized circuits are sufficient to obtain a constant-round protocol. Next, Pandey et al. [2008] provided a construction of a noninteractive nonmalleable commitment based on a new hardness assumption with a strong nonmalleability flavour; in contrast to the earlier constant-round constructions, their protocol has a black-box proof of security.
But, despite two decades of research, there have been no improvements over the original DDN construction, when only assuming the existence of one-way functions, leaving open the following question.
Does there exist a sublogarithmic nonmalleable commitment scheme, assuming only one-way functions?
Settling the Round-Complexity of Non-Malleable Commitments
In this work, we settle the round-complexity of nonmalleable commitments: we present a constant-round protocol in the "plain" model that is based on the assumption of oneway functions, and has a black-box proof of security. Since the existence of commitment schemes already implies the existence of one-way functions (cf. Impagliazzo and Luby [1989] ), we have the following theorem. THEOREM 1.1. Assume the existence of a commitment scheme. Then, there exists a constant-round nonmalleable commitment scheme with a black-box proof of security.
Concurrent Nonmalleability. As mentioned, the original notion of nonmalleability considers an MIM attacker participating in a single execution on the left and a single execution on the right. Already the original DDN paper suggested that a stronger notion of nonmalleability-concurrent nonmalleability-where the MIM may participate in an unbounded number of executions on both the left and the right, is desirable. Pass and Rosen [2005a] provided the first construction of a concurrently nonmalleable commitment scheme; their scheme only has a constant number of rounds but relies on the existence of claw-free permutations (and non-black-box techniques). Subsequently, Lin et al. [2008] provided an O(n)-round construction based on one-way functions. As we show, our protocol is also concurrently nonmalleable.
Robust Nonmalleability. In this work, we also introduce a new notion of nonmalleability: robust nonmalleability. Roughly speaking, whereas traditional nonmalleability considers a scenario where a MIM participates in the same commitment protocol on the left and the right, r-robustness considers a notion of nonmalleability for commitments where the MIM attacker participates in an arbitrary r-round protocol on the left, and the commitment protocol on the right. Robustness is useful when using nonmalleable commitments as subprotocols within larger protocols (see Section 1.3). As we show, for any constant r, our protocol can be made r-robust while still remaining constant-round.
Thus, summarizing this discussion, we have Theorem 1.2. THEOREM 1.2. Assume the existence of a commitment scheme. Then, for any constant r, there exists a constant-round commitment scheme that is r-robust concurrently nonmalleable with a black-box proof of security.
Applications to Secure Computation
As mentioned, independence of inputs is crucial for secure multiparty computation protocols. Indeed, there has been a tight interplay between work on the round-complexity of multiparty computation (MPC) and work on nonmalleable commitments.
Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson's original work on secure multiparty computation [Goldreich et al. 1987 ] showed a (m)-round multiparty computation protocol based on the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations (TDPs), where m is the number of players in the execution; implicit in their work is a O(n)-round non-malleable commitment for the special case of so-called "synchronizing" adversaries that have identities of length log n. Subsequent works improved the round-complexity by making stronger assumptions. Katz et al. [2003] , following the work by Chor and Rabin [1987] , obtained a O(log m)-round MPC protocol assuming TDPs and dense cryptosystems by relying on the nonmalleable commitments from Dolev et al. [2000] . By additionally assuming the existence of hash functions collision-resistant against circuits of subexponential size (and non-black-box techniques), they also obtained a O(1)-round MPC protocol by instead relying on the nonmalleable commitment from Barak [2002] . More recently, Pass [2004] , showed the existence of a O(1)-rounds MPC protocol assuming only TDPs and (standard) collision resistant hash functions (but still using non-blackbox techniques); this technique in turn was used in the nonmalleable commitment of Pass and Rosen [2005a] .
The implicit connection between the round-complexity of nonmalleable commitments and secure multiparty was formalized by : they show that the existence of k-round 4-robust nonmalleable commitments and the existence of TDPs implies the existence of O(k)-round secure multiparty computation.
Combining the result of with Theorem 1.2, we get that secure multiparty computations can be performed in a constant number of round based on only TDPs. THEOREM 1.3. Assume the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. Then there exists a constant-round protocol for secure multiparty computation.
Applications to Nonmalleable ZK
Nonmalleable zero-knowledge [Dolev et al. 2000] consider the execution of zeroknowledge protocols in the presence of a MIM attacker. Roughly speaking, a zeroknowledge protocol is nonmalleable if the MIM attacker can only provide convincing right-interaction proofs of statements that it could have proved without participating in the left interaction. The recent result of Lin et al. [2010] shows that the existence of k-round 4-robust nonmalleable commitments implies the existence of O(k)-round non-malleable zero-knowledge arguments for NP. By combining their results with Theorem 1.2, we directly have that the existence of one-way functions implies the existence a constant-round zero-knowledge argument for NP. THEOREM 1.4. Assume the existence of one-way functions. Then there exists a constant-round nonmalleable zero-knowledge argument for NP with a black-box proof of security.
A New Technique: "Message-Scheduling in the head"
The main idea underlying all nonmalleable commitment schemes is to "encode" the identity of the committer into the protocol. At the very least, this ensures that unless the attacker copies the identity of the left committer, the attacker cannot simply forward messages between the left and the right executions. But we also need to ensure that the attacker cannot in a clever way maul the messages it receives on the left so they become useful on the right. For instance, in the original DDN construction, the identity is encoded into the scheduling of messages in the protocol; on a very high level (and oversimplifying), the idea is to ensure that, at some point in the execution, the MIM must "speak" while only receiving "useless" messages. The problem with this approach is that it requires a high round-complexity.
We will revisit the DDN approach. The main idea behind our scheme is to perform the message scheduling "in the head". A bit more precisely, our protocol follows the "simulation-soundness" paradigm of Sahai [1999] , first used in the context of CCA-secure encryption, and next used by Pass and Rosen [2005a] in the context of nonmalleable commitments; that is, the main component of our construction is a method for enabling us to "simulate" the left interaction, while ensuring that the right interaction remains "sounds". Towards this, we embed a "trapdoor" into the protocol which depends on the identity of the interaction; proving simulation-soundness then essentially amounts to showing that there exists a way to recover the trapdoor for the left interaction, while ensuring that the adversary does not recover the trapdoor for the right interaction (as long as the right interaction has a different identity than the left interaction).
The idea is to have a protocol where the trapdoor can be recovered by "rewinding" some specific messages in the protocol, called slots, in a specific order which depends on the identity of the interaction. Furthermore, the protocol should have the property that if this specific rewinding order is not the rewinding order actually used, then a trapdoor cannot be recovered. So, if we rewind the left interaction according to the rewinding order corresponding to the identity of the left interaction, this will still not enable the adversary to recover the trapdoor corresponding to the right interaction (unless the identity of the right interaction is the same as the identity of the left interaction). In our particular instantiation of this idea, the trapdoor will be a "signature-chain" (i.e., a signature on a signature on a signature, etc.) of length n (i.e., the identity length) using different keys; the choice of the keys in the signature chain are determined by the identity of the interaction. Next, the protocol will have a "slot" for each of the keys where the receiver is willing to sign a single message for the committer using the key corresponding to the slot. The key point is that the simulator is able to rewind the slots in an appropriate order to recover a signature-chain corresponding to the identity of the left interaction; but the rewindings will still not enable the adversary to recover a signature-chain corresponding to any other identity.
Historical Notes
This article is a combined version of and Lin and Pass [2011] . In , we first showed the existence of a O(1) log * n -round protocol that is based on the existence of one-way functions and uses a black-box proof of security. On a high level, the main technique of was a method for amplifying nonmalleability: that is, we presented a method for transforming a nonmalleable commitment scheme that handles identities of length t into one that handles identities of length O(2 t ). The O(1) log * n -round protocol was finally obtained starting off with the protocol of DDN for constant length identities and next iteratively amplifying it. The notion of robust nonmalleability was also first defined in and was an integral part of the amplification procedure: in fact, our amplification procedure could only be applied to robust nonmalleable commitments.
In , we additionally pointed out that the amplification procedure yields a natural route towards constant-round nonmalleable commitments: it suffices to come with a constant-round protocol that handles identities of length (log) k n = log log · · · log n, where k is a constant; any such protocol can be amplified to a full-fledged nonmalleable commitment while still remaining constant round. Subsequent work by Pass and Wee [2010] obtained a constant-round protocol based on subexponentially hard one-way functions (again using a black-box proof of security), by following this paradigm: Subexponential one-way functions were used to construct a constant-round nonmalleable commitment for "small" identities, and the protocol can then be amplified into a full-fledged one. An elegant work by Wee [2010] later simplified and improved the amplification procedure of , leading to a protocol using O(log * n)-rounds, based on one-way functions. Finally, independently of Lin and Pass [2011] , a beautiful work by Goyal [2011] also obtains a constant-round nonmalleable commitment based on one-way functions; the construction of Goyal [2011] also follows this amplification paradigm, but Goyal manages to construct a constantround robust nonmalleable commitment protocol for small identities based on one-way functions.
In contrast to these works, the construction from Lin and Pass [2011] (which is what we present in the current article) is direct: we no longer require amplification; instead we directly construct a "full-fledged" robust nonmalleable protocol (for long identities). Nevertheless, some of the ideas used in the amplification procedure of are helpful when analyzing our protocol.
Outline
In Section 2, we provide some preliminaries. In Section 3, we provide an overview of our protocol construction and its security proof. In Section 4, we provide some formalizations and results abouts "signature-chains". Our protocol (which relies on the notion of a signature chain) is presented in Section 5. We provide the proof of (stand-alone) nonmalleability in Section 6; in Sections 7 and 8, we demonstrate that our protocol is also concurrent nonmalleable, and can be made r-robust for any constant r.
PRELIMINARIES
Let N denote the set of all positive integers. For any integer n ∈ N, let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, We denote by {0, 1} n the set of binary strings of length n, and {0, 1, 2} n the set of trinary strings of length n. Given a binary (or trinary) string ψ of length n, we denote by [ψ] i 1 the prefix of ψ of length i. We denote by PPT probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines. We assume familiarity with interactive Turing machines, denoted ITM, interactive protocols, and computational indistinguishability. Given a pair of ITMs, A and B, we denote by A(x), B(y) (z) the random variable representing the (local) output of B, on common input z and private input y, when interacting with A with private input x, when the random tape of each machine is uniformly and independently chosen. We also assume familiarity with notions of interactive proofs, zero-knowledge, witness indistinguishability, proofs (arguments) of knowledge and signature schemes; the formal definitions of these notions are provided in Appendix A.
Signature Schemes
We focus on fixed-length signature schemes = (Gen, Sign, V er) , that is, the signing algorithm Sign on input 1 n , a public key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , always outputs a signature of length n. We refer the reader to Appendix A for a formal definition. Such signature schemes can be constructed relying on universal one-way hash functions [Naor and Yung 1989] , which in turn can be based on any one-way function [Rompel 1990] . A signature scheme always refers to a fixed-length signature scheme.
Commitment Schemes
Commitment schemes are used to enable a party, known as the sender, to commit itself to a value while keeping it secret from the receiver (this property is called hiding). Furthermore, the commitment is binding, and thus in a later stage when the commitment is opened, it is guaranteed that the "opening" can yield only a single value determined in the committing phase. In this work, we consider commitment schemes that are statistically binding, namely while the hiding property only holds against computationally bounded (nonuniform) adversaries, the binding property is required to hold against unbounded adversaries. Two-round (i.e., a single message from the receiver followed by a single message from the committer) commitment schemes are known to exist based on the minimal assumption of one-way functions [Naor 1991; Håstad et al. 1999] . In the sequel of the article, a commitment scheme always refers to a statistically binding commitment.
Tag-Based Commitment Scheme. Following Pass and Rosen [2005a] and Dolev et al. [2000] , we consider tag-based commitment schemes where, in addition to the security parameter, the committer and the receiver also receive a "tag"-a.k.a. the identity-id as common input.
We refer the reader to A.9 in Appendix A for formal definitions.
Concurrent Nonmalleable Commitments
We recall the definition of concurrent nonmalleability from Lin et al. [2008] . For convenience, we use a slightly different presentation (based on indistinguishability rather than simulation); equivalence follows using a standard argument (c.f., Goldwasser and Micali [1984] and Pass and Rosen [2005a] ). Let C, R be a tag-based commitment scheme, and let n ∈ N be a security parameter. Consider a man-in-the-middle adversary A (as shown in Figure 1 ) that, on inputs n and z (where z is received as an auxiliary input), participates in m left and right interactions simultaneously. In the left interactions the man-in-the-middle adversary A interacts with C, receiving commitments to values v 1 , . . . , v m , using identities of length n, id 1 , . . . , id m ∈ {0, 1} n , of its choice. In the right interactions A interacts with R attempting to commit to a sequence of related valuesṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽ m , again using identities of length nĩ d 1 , . . . ,ĩ d m of its choice. If any of the right commitments are invalid, or undefined, its value is set to ⊥. For any i such thatĩ d i = id j for some j, setṽ i = ⊥-that is, any commitment where the adversary uses the same identity as one of the left interactions is considered invalid. Let mim Definition 2.1. A commitment scheme C, R is said to be concurrent nonmalleable (with respect to itself) if for every polynomial p(·), and every PPT man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates in at most m = p(n) concurrent executions, the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable.
We also consider relaxed notions of concurrent nonmalleability: one-one, one-many, and many-one secure nonmalleable commitments (see Figure 2) . In a one-one (a.k.a., a standalone secure) nonmalleable commitment, we consider only adversaries A that participate in one left and one right interaction; in one-many, A participates in one left and many right, and in many-one, A participates in many left and one right.
As shown in Lin et al. [2008] , any protocol that is one-many nonmalleable is also concurrent nonmalleable. 
PROPOSITION 2.2 [LIN ET AL. 2008]. Let C, R be a one-many concurrent nonmalleable commitment. Then, C, R is also a concurrent nonmalleable commitment.

Robustness: Nonmalleability with Respect to k-Round Protocols
The concept of nonmalleability is traditionally only considered in a setting where a man-in-the middle adversary is participating in two (or more) executions of the same protocol. We here consider a new notion of nonmalleability with respect to arbitrary k-round protocols.
Consider a one-many man-in-the-middle adversary A (as shown in Figure 3 ) that participates in one left interaction-communicating with a machine B-and many right interactions-acting as a committer using the commitment scheme C, R . As in the standard definition of nonmalleability, A can adaptively choose the identities in the right interactions. We denote by mim Definition 2.3. Let C, R be a commitment scheme, and B a PPT ITM. We say the commitment scheme C, R is one-many nonmalleable with respect to B, if for every two sequences {y 1 n } n∈N and {y
then it also holds that, for every PPT one-many man-in-the-middle adversary A,
We say that C, R is one-many k-robust if C, R is one-many nonmalleable with respect to any machine B that interacts with the man-in-the-middle adversary in k rounds.
PROOF OVERVIEW
To explain the main ideas behind our construction, we here focus on outlining the construction of a constant-round nonmalleable commitment scheme that is secure for synchronizing and nonaborting adversaries; we next comment on how to deal with general adversaries. An adversary is said to be synchronizing if it "aligns" the left and the right executions; that is, whenever it receives message i on the left, it directly sends message i on the right, and vice versa. An adversary is said to be nonaborting if it never sends any invalid messages in the left interaction (where it is acting as a receiver); it might still send invalid messages on the right. As mentioned in the introduction, the idea is to have a protocol with an "identitybased trapdoor" embedded into it. The trapdoor will be a "signature-chain" using a sequence of keys that are determined by the identity of the protocol. More precisely, we say that (σ 0 , σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) is a plain signature chain 1 with respect to the signature scheme , the verification keys vk 0 , vk 1 and the pattern ψ ∈ {0, 1} n if σ 0 = 0 and for all 0 ≤ i < n, σ i+1 is a signature on the message (i, σ i ) with respect to the key vk ψ i+1 . For convenience of notation, for the remainder of this section we fix a particular signature scheme ; all signatures we use are with respect to this this particular scheme.
The following simple claim regarding signature chains will be useful. Consider a "signature game" where an adversary A gets access to two randomly chosen verification keys vk 0 , vk 1 and additionally has access to signature oracles with respect to vk 0 and vk 1 ; let ϕ denote the "access pattern" of the adversary to the signature oracle (that is, if the ith oracle call is to the signature oracle with respect to vk b , then ϕ i = b). The claim now is that, with overwhelming probability, if in the signature game, A manages to output a plain signature chain with respect to vk 0 , vk 1 , and pattern ψ, then ψ is a substring of ϕ.
The protocol for committing to a string v with identity id proceeds as follows.
Slot 1.
The receiver R generates a key-pair (sk 0 , vk 0 ) for the signature scheme , and sends vk 0 to the committer C. C next send a random message r 0 to R who signs r 0 and then returns the signature to C. Slot 2. R generates another key-pair (sk 1 , vk 1 ) and sends vk 1 to the committer C. As in Slot 1, C next send a random message r 1 to R who signs r 1 and then returns the signature to C. Commit phase. C commits to v using a standard statistically binding commitment. Proof phase. C gives R a "special-purpose" 2 witness indistinguishable argument of knowledge of the fact that it either knows the value committed to in the commit phase, or that it knows a plain signature chain with respect to vk 0 , vk 1 , and id.
We now turn to argue that this protocol is nonmalleable with respect to non-aborting and synchronizing adversaries. For simplicity, we here focus only on one-one (i.e., standalone) nonmalleability (but the same proof actually also works for concurrent nonmalleability). Consider a man-in-the-middle adversary A that uses identity id on the left and identityĩ d = id on the right, and receives a commitment to the value v on the left. We will argue that no matter what the value of v is, the value it commits to on the right will be indistinguishable. Towards this goal, consider a hybrid experiment where the left interaction is simulated by acting honestly in Slots 1 and 2, next committing to 0, and finally using a "fake-witness"-namely a signature chain-in the proof phase; the simulator obtains this fake witness by simply rewinding Slots 1 and 2 (i.e., to rewinding slots b, we restore the state of A after vk b has been sent, and send a new message to be signed) in the appropriate order to obtain a signature chain with respect to id (note that since A is nonaborting, each time the simulator asks it to sign a message, it does). To show this claim, we now argue that no matter what the value of v is, the value A commits to on the right in the real execution (when receiving a commitment to v), is indistinguishable from the value it commits to on the right when the left interaction instead is simulated.
The key-point of the proof is the claim that even in the simulation, A cannot use a fake-witness in the right interaction. This follows from the fact that since A is synchronizing, when we rewind Slots 1 and 2 on the left, the same slots are rewound on the right in exactly the same order. Thus, by the signature-game claim, if A manages to get a signature chain it must be a subset of the pattern 01id (the reason we need to append 01 is that A gets two signatures in the honest emulation of Slots 1 and 2, already before we start the rewindings). So, if we appropriately restrict the identity set (e.g., by requiring that all identities start with 10) then the only valid identity that is a substring of 01id is id, and thusĩ d = id, which is a contradiction.
To argue that the value committed to on the right does not change when we move from the real interaction to the simulation, consider an intermediary hybrid where we only change the witness used in the proof phase (but keep the value committed to in the commit phase to v). Note that since the adversary is synchronizing, the proof phase of the left interaction appears completely after the commitment (in Stage 2) in the right interaction. Therefore, the right value does not change at all when switching the the witness used in the proof phase on the left.
Finally, we simply have to argue that the value on the right does not change once we change the value committed to in the commit phase on the left. By the hiding property of the left commitment, the view of the adversary does not change when the left committed value switches. But since the value committed to on the right cannot be efficiently recovered, this does not directly imply that the committed value also is indistinguishable. To resolve this problem, we rely on the argument of knowledge property of the proof phase: A witness on the right can be extracted efficiently from the proof phase. Since the witness used in the right interaction cannot be a fake witness (by the previous key-claim), it must be the value committed to in the commit phase, so indistinguishability of the committed value follows from the hiding property of the left commitment.
Dealing with Aborting Adversaries. When considering aborting adversaries, we run into two obstacles.
-The adversary might notice that the simulator is feeding it signature chains to sign (instead of random messages) and thus decide to abort the left execution. We handle this by adapting the definition of a signature chain: instead of requiring the chain to be "a signature on a signature on a signature... etc", we require a signaturechain to be a signature on "a commitment of a signature on a commitment of a signature... etc". And next, in the protocol, we let C send commitments to 0 instead of random strings. To be able to establish an analog of this signature-game claim, we additionally require C to give a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of the value it committed to before R agrees to sign it. -Another problem is that A might abort the left execution with some probability p.
This means that we might have to rewind the left execution many times (roughly 1/ p times) before getting the signature we are looking for. As a consequence, the "access pattern" on the right will be a substring of 01id * 1 id * 2 · · · id * n . To get around this problem, we add an additional slot (and a corresponding signature key). Next, we require that the signature-chain corresponding to the identity id to be with respect to the pattern 2id 1 2id 2 2id 3 · · · 2id n .
Dealing with nonsynchronizing adversaries. As is usually the case, synchronizing adversaries are the "hardest" to deal with. To prove security against nonsynchronizing adversaries, we follow basically the same argument: First, if A is not synchronizing there exists some slot that is never rewound and so if the identity of the right interaction contains at least two 0's and two 1's, we can still establish this key-claim. Next, to argue that the committed value on the right does not change, we consider again the previous intermediary hybrid. However, when the adversary is not synchronizing, it may choose to interleave messages in the proof phase of the left interaction and the commitment of the right interaction, and thus the right committed value may change when the witness on the left changes. To overcome this problem, we again rely on the argument of knowledge property of the proof phase to extract a witness from the right interaction. Since the witness cannot be a signature-chain (by the key-claim), it must be the committed value; then the indistinguishability of the committed value follows from the witness-indistinguishability of the left proof phase. However, one problem is that extraction on the right may rewind the left proof phase and thus break the witness indistinguishability property. One way of resolving this problem would be to (in analogy with Pass and Rosen [2005a] ) have the proof phase be statistically witness indistinguishable; but this requires additional assumptions (to keep it constant-round). Instead, we here introduce a different technique to to overcome this problem: we let the proof phase consist of multiple sequentially ordered witness indistinguishable specialsound proofs.
3 This allows us to change the witness in each of the proofs, one by one, while ensuring that the witness on the right can be extracted from some other proof, without rewinding the left proof where the witness currently is being changed.
SIGNATURE CHAINS AND GAMES
Let
= (Gen, Sign, V er) be a fixed-length signature scheme, and com a statistically binding commitment scheme. For simplicity of notation, we keep these schemes fixed, and provide our definitions and protocols with respect to those particular schemes. Furthermore, for simplicity of exposition, we assume that com that is noninteractive; however, all of our definitions and protocols can be easily modified to work with any tworound statistically binding commitment schemes; see Remark 5.2 for further details.
We now turn to formally defining the notion of a signature-chain and then proceed to defining signature-games. Definition 4.1 Signature-Chain. Let ∈ N, ψ ∈ {0, 1, 2} and vk 0 , vk 1 , vk 2 ∈ {0, 1} * be three verification keys for the signature scheme . We say that a triplet δ = (σ ,c,r) is a signature-chain with respect to keys vk 0 , vk 1 , vk 2 and pattern ψ, ifσ ,c, andr are vectors of length satisfying the following properties.
i is a commitment to the tuple (i − 1,σ i−1 ) using com and randomnessr i ; andc 1 is a commitment to 0 m using com and randomnessr 1 , where m = log + n.
We say that a signature-chain δ = (σ ,c,r) has length if |σ | = l.
We proceed to define a signature-game SG A, (n, z) , where A on input 1 n , z interacts with a Challenger in the following three stages. (ϕ i , c) , where ϕ i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, followed by a 5-round ZKAOK proof of the statement that c is a valid commitment of com. -if the proof is convincing, the Challenger signs the commitment c using the signing key s ϕ i and returns the signature to A; otherwise, it aborts the iteration (without giving back a signature). Stage 3. Finally, A outputs the tuple (δ, ψ).
We call the sequence ϕ = ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , . . . of signing request, the "access pattern" of A. We say that the output of A is well-formed if δ is a length l(n) signature-chain with respect to vk 0 , vk 1 , vk 2 and ψ. Finally, we say that A wins if its output is well formed at ψ is not a substring of its access pattern ϕ (and loses otherwise).
LEMMA 4.2. For every PPT adversary A and every polynomial , there exists a negligible function μ, such that for every n ∈ N, z ∈ {0, 1} * , the probability that A wins in SG A, (n, z) is at most μ(n).
PROOF. Consider any adversary A, polynomial , n ∈ N, and z ∈ {0, 1} * . Without loss of generality, we can assume that A always outputs tuple (δ = (σ ,c,r), ψ) such that |σ | = |c| = |r| = ψ| = l(n) (since whenever it doesn't it loses). For each i ∈ [l(n)], define the random variable I i to be the index of the first iteration (in Stage 2 of the game SG A, (n, z)) in which A queries the Challenger for a signature of the commitmentc i under key v ψ i ; if A never queries the Challenger for a signature ofc i , I i is set to ⊥.
Note that if the output of A is well-formed, it contains a signature-chain δ = (σ ,c,r) with respect to pattern ψ, such that for every i,σ i is a valid signature ofc i under key v ψ i . It thus follows from the unforgibility of the signature scheme that, except with negligible probability, for each i, A must have queriedc i for a signature of v ψ i in some iteration. We thus have the following claim. CLAIM 4.3. For every PPT adversary A and polynomial , there exists a negligible function μ 1 , such that for all n ∈ N, z ∈ {0, 1} * , the probability that the output of A in SG A, (n, z) is of A is well formed and there exists an i ∈ [ (n)] such that I i = ⊥, is smaller than μ 1 (n).
We also have the following claim. Before proceeding to the proof of Claims 4.4, we let us first prove Lemma 4.2 using Claims 4.3 and 4.4. It follows from the two claims that, except with negligible probability, either the output of A is not well formed, or the output is well formed and for all i, I i = ⊥ and I i < I i+1 . In the former case, the adversary loses the game. In the latter case, as I i = ⊥ for all i, A must have asked for a signature using key v ψ i in the I i th iteration, which means ϕ I i = ψ i . Furthermore, as I i < I i+1 for all i, it follows that ψ is a substring of ϕ. Therefore, A loses in this case as well. Thus, except with negligible probability, A loses. PROOF OF CLAIM 4.4. First notice that it follows from the (statistical) binding property of com, that except with negligible probability, 4 if the output (δ = (σ ,c,r), ψ) of A is well formed, then for all i,c i =c i+1 , sincec i ,c i+1 are respectively commitments to tuples of the form (i, ·) and (i + 1, ·). It follows that, except with negligible probability, if the output of A is well formed, there doesn't exists some i such that I i , I i+1 = ⊥ but I i = I i+1 . Thus, it suffices to bound the probability that the output of A is well formed and there exists some i such that I i , I i+1 = ⊥ and I i > I i+1 .
Towards this, assume for contradiction that there exists an adversary A and a polynomial , such that there exists a function i : N → N and a polynomial p, such that for infinitely many n ∈ N, z ∈ {0, 1} * , the probability that the output of A in the game SG A, (n, z) is well formed, I i , I i+1 = ⊥, and I i > I i+1 for i = i(n), is at least 1/ p(n). We can construct a machine B that violate the unforgibility of the signature scheme .
B, on input 1 n , z and a randomly generated verification key vk, has access to the signing oracle corresponding to vk, and tries to forge a signature (of vk) as follows: it internally emulates an execution of the signature game SG A, (n, z) with A honestly, with the following exceptions.
-In Stage 1, it picks an index t ∈ {0, 1, 2} at random and forwards the verification key vk to the adversary as the tth verification key. -In Stage 2, whenever A requests a signature of a message m under key vk, it obtains such a signature from the signing oracle and forwards it to A. Furthermore, it guesses that I i = u and I i+1 = k, for random u > k. Then, in the kth iteration (in Stage 2 of SG A, (n, z)), after receiving a request from A to sign the commitment c, it extracts out the value ( j, σ * ) committed to in c from the ZKAOK that A provides following the signing request. Later, in the uth iteration, when A submits a query c * to the Challenger, it checks whether σ * is a valid signature of c * under key vk. If so, it halts and outputs the message-signature pair (c * , σ * ); otherwise, it halts and outputs fail.
By construction, B emulates the view of A in the signature game SG A, (n, z) perfectly before it halts. Therefore, by our hypothesis, with probability at least 1/ p(n), in emulation by B, A would query for the first time the commitmentsc i andc i+1 in iterations I i and I i+1 respectively, such that I i+1 < I i andc i+1 is a commitment to a tuple (i + 1,σ i+1 ), whereσ i+1 is a signature ofc i under the verification key v ψ i . Let M(n) be the maximum number of iterations in the game; M is polynomially bounded since the running-time of A is. With probability at least
, it holds that (1) this event occurs in the emulation by B and (2) B correctly guesses the values of I i , I i+1 and v ψ i . In this case, except with negligible probability, the committed value σ * that B extracts out from the ZKAOK following c =c i+1 contains a valid signature of c i , which is queried for the first time in the uth iteration for a signature using key vk. Hence, B will output a valid message-signature pair (c i , σ * ) for vk, without querying the signing oraclec i (since once the queryc i is submitted for the first time in iteration u, B halts immediately and outputs the pair); this violates the unforgibility of the signature scheme .
THE PROTOCOL
Let
= (Gen, Sign, V er) be the fixed-length signature scheme, and com the noninteractive statistically binding commitment scheme considered in the last section. To simplify the presentation of the proof, we assume that both and com can be "broken"-that is, signatures can be generated for any message, and the value committed to can be recovered for any commitment-in time 2
n/2 where n is the security parameter; this is without loss of generality since we can always appropriately "scale-down" the security parameter in and com (and make sure that com commits to values "bit-by-bit"). To further simplify the presentation, we provide the construction of a nonmalleable commitment C, R that works assuming player identities are -bit binary strings that contains at least two 0-bits and two 1-bits; any such scheme can trivially be turned into one that works for arbitrary identities (by simply appending two 0's and two 1's to the identity). C, R additionally relies on a 4-round W I special sound proof system, and a 5-round ZKAOK protocol; both can be constructed from one-way functions.
To commit to a value v, the Committer and the Receiver of C, R , on common input a security parameter 1 n (in unary) and an identity id ∈ D , proceed in the following three stages. where the function pattern : {0, 1} * → {0, 1, 2} * maps a (binary) identity id of length to a trinary string of length 2 as follows:
This statement is proved using k + 5 sequential invocations of a 4-round W I special sound proof system, where k is the number of messages in Stage 1 of the protocol; we additionally require that the length of the "challenge" in each special-sound proof is n.
We refer to the last three steps of an iteration in Stage 1 as a slot, which opens when the Committer send the com commitment to 0 m , and closes when the Receiver returns a signature to the commitment. We call the slot in iteration i, the i'th slot.
It is easy to see that the protocol C, R consists of a constant number of messages. Furthermore, it follows using standard techniques that C, R is a valid commitment scheme.
PROPOSITION 5.1. C, R is a commitment scheme.
PROOF. We show that the C, R scheme satisfies the binding and hiding properties.
-Binding. The binding property follows directly from the statistically binding property of com used in Stage 2. -Hiding. The hiding property essentially follows from the hiding property of com and the fact that Stage 3 of the protocol is W I (since W I proofs are closed under concurrent composition [Feige and Shamir 1990] ). For completeness, we provide the proof. We show that any adversary R * that violates the hiding property of C, R can be used to violate the hiding property of com. More precisely, given any adversary R * , such that, for infinitely many n ∈ N, and v 1 , v 2 ∈ {0, 1} n , R * distinguishes commitments to v 1 and v 2 made using C, R , we construct a machine R that distinguishes commitments to v 1 and v 2 made using com. Note that the execution of a commitment of C, R to v 1 proceeds identically as that of a commitment to v 2 before the Stage 2 commitment of com is sent. Then by our hypothesis, there must exist a partial joint view ρ of the committer and R * that determines the execution of the commitment before Stage 2, such that, conditioned on ρ occurring, R * distinguishes commitments to v 1 and v 2 . Let δ be a valid signature-chain corresponding to the transcript of Stage 1 in ρ. R on auxiliary input ρ and δ proceeds as follows: it internally incorporates R * , and feed R * its part of view in ρ; it then forwards the external commitment made using com to R * in Stage 2; in Stage 3, it gives W I proofs using δ as a "fake witness". Finally, it outputs whatever R * outputs. From the W I property of Stage 3, it follows that R distinguishes the commitment made using com, if R * distinguishes the commitment made using C, R conditioned on ρ occurring.
Remark 5.2. Both the definitions of signature-games and our nonmalleable commitment protocols make use of a noninteractive statistically binding commitment scheme com. Both can be easily modified to work also with any two-round statistically binding commitment scheme com as follows: The first message r of a commitment of com is sent at the beginning of the execution, and then the rest of the execution proceeds just as if com had been noninteractive. More specifically, for any first message r, let com r denote the protocol containing only the second message of com with respect to a fixed first message r. com r can be viewed informally as a noninteractive commitment scheme; commitments of com r are hiding for any r (even if r is reused in many commitments), and binding holds for a randomly chosen r. The rest of the execution simply proceeds as before, using com r as the commitment scheme. Exactly the same proof as in Section 4 and Section 6 still go through using these modified construction, since commitments of com r are hiding.
PROOF OF NONMALLEABILITY
In this section, we show that C, R is standalone nonmalleable. In Sections 8 and 7, we extend the proof to show that C, R is also robust and concurrent nonmalleable.
THEOREM 6.1. C, R is (one-one) nonmalleable.
PROOF. The goal is to show that for every one-one man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates in one left and one right execution, the following ensembles are indistinguishable:
,1} * Towards this, we define a series of hybrid experiments H 0 , . . . , H k+6 . In each of these experiments, we show that the view of A, combined with the value that A commits to on the right, are indistinguishable. Let hyb i (v, z) denote the random variable describing the view of A(z), combined with the value it commits to in the right interaction in hybrid H i (as usual, the committed value is replaced with ⊥ if the right interaction fails or if A has copied the identity of the left interaction). Hybrid H 0 . In H 0 , we first perfectly emulate a real execution of mim by rewinding the appropriate slot in Stage 1 of the left interaction. More precisely, the procedure repeatedly rewinds A from where the slot ψ i+1 opens on the left in the Main Execution, and commits to the tuple (i,σ i ) (instead of 0 m ) in the rewindings, until this left-slot closes successfully (i.e., A returns a valid signature on the commitment under key v ψ i+1 ). In each of these rewindings, the right executions are emulated using fresh randomness; in particular, this means that whenever a rewinding goes beyond the point when a verification key is sent in the right interaction, in each such rewinding a fresh verification key is picked. Then, the extraction procedure simply setsσ i+1 to be this signature, and again setsc i+1 andr i+1 to be the commitment and randomness used.
If the extraction procedure takes more than 2 n/2 steps, it is "cut-off "; in this case, a signature chain can be recovered in time poly(2 n/2 ) by our assumption on the signature scheme . The extraction procedure thus always terminates and always recovers a valid signature chain for the left interaction.
Since the view of A in the Main Execution in H 0 is perfectly emulated as in mim A C,R (v, z), we trivially have that the view and value A commits to in H 0 is identically distributed to that in the real execution.
CLAIM 6.2. For every PPT adversary A, it holds that:
Hybrid H 1 to H k+5 . In hybrids H 1 to H k+5 , we change the witness used in the k + 5 W ISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the left interaction. More specifically, experiment H i proceeds identically to H i−1 , except that in the first i proofs in Stage 3 of the left interaction, we prove that there exists a signature-chain with respect to v 0 , v 1 , v 2 and pattern pattern(id l ), by using the extracted signature-chain δ as a "fake-witness". We show that the view and value committed to on the right interaction in H i−1 and H i are indistinguishable.
PROPOSITION 6.3. For every PPT adversary A, and every function i : N → N, it holds that:
hyb i(n)−1 (v, z) n∈N,v∈{0,1} n ,z∈{0,1} * ≈ hyb i(n) (v, z) n∈N,v∈{0,1} n ,z∈{0 ,1} * .
Towards this, we reduce the indistinguishability of {hyb i(n)−1 (v, z)} and {hyb i(n) (v, z) } to the witness indistinguishability of the Stage 3. More specifically, consider some adversary A, a function i, and a polynomial p, such that (for infinitely many n ∈ N, inputs v ∈ {0, 1} n and z ∈ {0, 1} * ,) hyb i(n)−1 (v, z) and hyb i (n)(v, z) are distinguishable with probability 1/ p(n). We show that there exists a PPT machine B that can violate the W I property of the W ISSP protocol P, V used in Stage 3 of the protocol.
On a high-level, the machine B, on common input 1 n and auxiliary input v, z, externally interacts with an honest prover P and receives a left-interaction Stage 3 proof, generated using either the real witness w 0 -the decommitment of the Stage 2 commitment in the left interaction-or the fake witness w 1 -a signature chain for the left interaction. Internally, B emulates an execution of either hyb i−1 or hyb i with A (depending on the witness used in the external proof), except that, messages in the ith proof in Stage 3 of the left interactions are forwarded externally. Furthermore, if the right interaction is successful and has a different identity from the left, B attempts to extract the value committed to on the right by repeatedly rewinding the W ISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the right interaction by sending new challenge messages in this proof. Since the ith left-proof is forwarded externally, the rewinding has to be done in a manner that does not "affect" the ith left-proof. Roughly speaking, this is possible since there are more W ISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the right interaction, than the number of messages in the ith left-proof. Therefore, in the right interaction, there exist some W ISSP proofs that does not interleave with any messages in the ith leftproof, and B can use rewindings to extract a witness without rewinding the left-proof. Our actual rewinding strategy also avoids rewinding Stage 1 of the left interaction, so that the fake-witness δ of the left interaction remains a valid signature chain also in the rewindings, and thus can be reused to simulate the left interaction also in the rewindings. This is again possible since there are more right-proofs than the number of messages in Stage 1 and the ith proof in the left interaction. To slightly simplify the analysis, we additionally "cut-off " the rewindings if B takes more than 2 n/2 steps and simply recover the value committed to in time poly(2 n/2 ); recall that this is possible due to our assumption on com.
If during the rewindings, B sends the same challenge message twice, it aborts outputting fail 1 . Additionally, if the witness extracted from the right interaction is not a valid decommitment (it could also be a fake-witness), B aborts outputting fail 2 . Otherwise, B outputs the emulated view of A, together with the value committed to in the right interaction.
See Figure 4 for a formal description of B. In Lemma 6.4, we show that the runningtime of machine B is "bounded", in the sense that the probability that B runs for super-polynomial time is negligible. LEMMA 6.4. There exists a polynomial function T , such that for every polynomial function q, every b ∈ {0, 1}, every sufficiently large n ∈ N, and inputs v ∈ {0, 1} n and z ∈ {0, 1} * , the probability that machine B runs for more than q(n)T (n) steps in an execution of the experiment STA b ( P, V , B, v, z) is smaller than 1/q(n).
Roughly speaking, the lemma is proven by first bounding the running-time of a "hypothetical procedure" which perform all the same rewindings, but otherwise acts honestly (i.e., always commits to 0 m in Stage 1, and always uses the honest witness in Stage 3); it follows using a simple " p × 1/ p" argument (similar to those in Lin et al. [2008] ) that the expected running-time of this procedure is polynomial. Next we show that, with high probability, the running-time of the actual procedure is not too far off. We note that due to reasons similar to those in Goldreich and Kahan [1996] we are not able to bound the expected running-time of B. Additionally, it seems unclear if the methods of Goldreich and Kahan [1996] could be applicable to obtain a simulation with an expected polynomial running-time. Fortunately, in our application, since we do not actually per se care about the running time of the simulation (but only care about breaking some specific security property, namely witness indistinguishability) our weaker bound suffices.
A formal proof of Lemma 6.4 can be found in Section 6.1. The following lemma is the core of our analysis.
LEMMA 6.5. The following holds.
Before proceeding to the proof of Lemma 6.5, let us see how Lemmas 6.5 and 6.4 together violate the W I property of the Stage 3 proofs. Recall that by our assumption, hyb i (v, z) and hyb i − 1(v, z) can be distinguished with probability 1/ p(n); by Lemma 6.5, STA 0 ( P, V , B, v, z) and STA 0 ( P, V , B, v, z) can thus be distinguished with probability at least, say, 3/4 p(n). By Lemma 6.4, the probability that B runs for more than, say, 4 p(n)T (n) steps in either experiment is at most 1/4 p(n). Therefore, by the union bound, the outputs of B (in STA 0 and STA 1 ) are still distinguishable with probability at least 1/4 p(n), even if we cut-off the execution of B after 4 p(n)T (n) steps (and output ⊥ if B fails to complete), which is a contradiction.
Let us now turn to proving Lemma 6.5.
PROOF OF LEMMA 6.5. By construction, B perfectly emulates the view of A in hyb i−1 (v, z) when receiving an external proof generated using the real witness w 0 , and that in hyb i (v, z) when receiving a proof generated using the fake witness w 1 . Therefore, to show Lemma 6.5, it suffices to show that B (almost) always extracts a valid decommitment for the right interaction if it is successful and has a different identity from the left interaction (recall that by statistical binding of C, R , the committed value is unique with overwhelming probability). In other words, showing Lemma 6.5 amounts to showing that the probability that B outputs fail 1 or fail 2 is negligible. CLAIM 6.6. There exists a negligible function μ, such that for every b ∈ {0, 1}, every sufficiently large n ∈ N, and inputs v ∈ {0, 1} n and z ∈ {0, 1} * , the probability that B outputs
PROOF. Recall that B outputs fail 1 only if in some rewinding it picks the same challenge β as the challenge β used in the same proof in the Main Execution. Since the number of rewindings by B is bounded by 2 n/2 and the length of each challenge is n, by the union bound, the probability that this happens is negligible. CLAIM 6.7. There exists a negligible function μ, such that, for every b ∈ {0, 1}, every sufficiently large n ∈ N, and inputs v ∈ {0, 1} n and z ∈ {0, 1} * , the probability that B outputs fail 2 in STA b ( P, V , B, v, z) is smaller than μ(n).
PROOF. Assume for contradiction that there exists a polynomial g(n), such that, with probability 1/g(n), B extracts an invalid decommitment from the right interaction. Towards reaching a contradiction, we consider another machine B , which proceeds identically to B except that it cuts-off the execution after g(n)T (n) steps (and outputs ⊥ in this case). It follows from Lemma 6.4 that the probability that B runs for more than g(n)T (n) steps is at most 1/2g(n). Therefore, the probability that B extracts out an invalid decommitment from the right interaction k is at least 1/2g(n). Furthermore, by the special-soundness property of the right-proofs, if the witness is not a valid decommitment, it must be a signature-chain δ with respect to the right-interaction keys v 0 , v 1 , v 2 and pattern pattern(id r ). Consider the following two possible adversarial schedulings with respect to the left and the kth right interactions in the Main Execution.
-Scheduling 1. A "aligns" the slots in the left and right interactions one by one: a right-slot is said to be aligned with a left-slot if (1) its corresponding verification key is sent before the left-slot opens, and (2) its opening message (i.e., the commitment from A) is sent after the left-slot opens; see Figure 5 (i). -Scheduling 2. A does not align the slots in the left and right interactions; see Figure 5 (ii). This means that there exists some right-interaction slot that is not aligned with any left-interaction slot.
Since Scheduling 1 and 2 are the only two possible schedulings, by our hypothesis, at least one of the following two conditions holds. -Condition 1. The probability that Scheduling 1 occurs in the Main Execution and that B extracts an invalid decommitment from the right interaction is nonnegligible. -Condition 2. The probability that Scheduling 2 occurs in the Main Execution and that B extracts an invalid decommitment from the right interaction is nonnegligible.
We show that neither condition can hold. Assume Condition 1 holds. We reach a contradiction by constructing a machine C that externally participates in the signature game, while internally emulating an execution of STA b ( P, V , B , v, z) except that messages in Stage 1 of the right interaction are emulated by forwarding the appropriate messages from the signature games to A. More precisely, C forwards the three verification keys vk 0 , vk 1 , vk 2 in the signature game to A as the verification keys in Stage 1 of the right interaction in the Main Execution. If Schedule 1 does not occur in the Main Execution, C simply aborts. Otherwise, whenever during some rewinding, A requests another signature in one of the slots on the Main Execution (and thus using one of vk 0 , vk 1 , vk 2 ), C obtains such a signature by accessing the appropriate signature oracle in the game and forwards it to A. Recall that whenever we rewind beyond the point where a verification key is sent, a new verification key is generated by B and thus B can obtain the appropriate signatures without querying the oracle. Since the left and right slots in the Main Execution are aligned one by one, we have that whenever the tth left-slot is rewound, the adversary A may only request new signatures using key v t on the right. It follows that the "access-pattern" of the signatures requested is a substring of
So, whenever B extracts out a signature-chain δ with respect to (keys v 0 , v 1 , v 2 and pattern pattern(id r )), C wins in the signature game since pattern(id r ) is not a substring of ϕ (as id r = id l ). Since the running-time of C is polynomial this contradicts Lemma 4.2. Assume Condition 2 holds. We construct a machine C just as in the previous case, except that C abort whenever Schedule 2 does not happen in the Main Execution. When Scheduling 2 does occurs in the Main Execution, there exists a right-slot t that is not aligned with any left-slots; in other words, in all the rewindings where A gets to request a new signature in Slot t on the right, the rewinding goes beyond the point where the verification key for slot t is sent (and so new keys gets generated in each rewinding) and thus the tth oracle is never used during the extraction phase. It follows that the access pattern in the signature game has a single character t, but the signature extracted is with respect to a pattern with two of each character. So, as in Condition 1, whenever B extracts out a signature-chain δ, C wins in the signature game. There is just one slight complication with the implementation of C : in the rewindings, B might rewind A in the middle of one of the ZKAOK in Stage 1, and since the ZKAOKs are not public-coin, we might not be able to emulate the continuation of the verifier strategy for this protocol. Note, however, that Lemma 4.2 still holds even if consider a slight variant of the signature game where after each ZKAOK the verifier reveals all of its random coins; this follows since this adjusted protocol would still be an ZKAOK and Lemma 4.2 no matter what ZKAOK we use in the signature game. C can now easily be implemented as an adversary for this modified signature game.
Hybrid H k+6 .
Hybrid H k+6 proceeds identically to H k+5 except that the Stage 2 commitment of the left execution is emulated by committing to 0 n . It follows using the same argument as in hybrids H i , for i ∈ [k + 5], that the value committed in the right interaction can be extracted without rewinding Stage 2 of the left interaction. It then follows from the hiding property of the Stage 2 commitment that the combined view and values committed to by A in H k+5 are indistinguishable from that in H k+6 .
It follows by a hybrid argument that,
,1} * . Since this holds for every value v, we have
Finally, since by the definition of hyb k+6 , it holds that for every v 1 , v 2 , and z, polynomial T 2 (n) such that for every polynomial q 2 , (every b ∈ {0, 1}, every sufficiently large n ∈ N, and inputs v ∈ {0, 1} n , z ∈ {0, 1} * ) the probability that B spends more than q 2 (n)T 2 (n) steps extracting the left "fake-witness" in STA b ( P, V , B, v, z) is smaller than 1/q 2 (n).
-Part 3-Time Spent Extracting the Committed Value on the Right. We show that there exists a polynomial T 3 (n) such that for every polynomial q 3 , the probability that B spends more than q 3 (n)T 3 (n) steps extracting the right committed value in STA b ( P, V , B, v, z) is smaller than 1/q 3 (n).
So given an arbitrary polynomial q, we get by the union bound that, the probability B spends more than 2q(n)T 2 (n) step in part 2, or more than 2q(n)T 3 (n) steps in part 3, is smaller than 1/q(n). We conclude that there exists some sufficiently big polynomial T (n) ≥ T 1 (n) + 2T 2 (n) + 2T 3 (n) such that for every polynomial q, the probability that B takes more than q(n)T (n) steps is smaller than 1/q(n).
Analysis of Part 2.
Recall that in an execution of STA b ( P, V , B, v, z) , the extraction of the left "fake-witness" proceeds in 2 iterations. The running-time of the first iteration is clearly polynomial; we proceed to analyze the time spent in the remainder of the iterations. Recall that in an iteration i > 1, B takes the signature-chain 1 . This is done by repeatedly rewinding A from the start of the left-slot ψ i and committing to (i − 1,σ i−1 ) in the rewindings, until A closes this left-slot successfully. (Below we assume for simplicity that the extraction procedure is never cut-off and may run for more than 2 n/2 steps, since this only increases the running time). Towards bounding the running-time of this extraction procedure, we first consider a hypothetical procedure, which proceeds almost the same as the actual extraction procedure, except that in the rewindings in iteration i > 1, instead of committing to (i − 1,σ i−1 ), it commits to 0 m . In other words, the hypothetical procedure simulates the view of A in the rewindings using identically the same distribution as in the Main Execution. We show that the expected running-time of this hypothetical procedure is poly(n); we next bound the running-time of the actual extraction procedure.
Running-Time Analysis of the Hypothetical Procedure.
Let ψ = pattern(id l ) be the pattern of the "fake-witness" of the left interaction. In iteration i > 1, the hypothetical extraction procedure repeatedly rewinds the left-slot ψ i ; let T i be the random variable that describes the time spent in rewinding the left-slot ψ i in iteration i > 1. We show that E [T i ] ≤ poly(n) and then by linearity of expectation, we conclude that the expected running-time of the hypothetical procedure is
since the number of iterations is poly(n). Let us turn to bounding E[T i ]. Let ψ i denote the set of prefixes ρ-that is, partial transcripts of the Main Execution-from where the left-slot ψ i opens. Given a prefix ρ ∈ ψ i , we introduce the following notations: -let Pr [ρ] denote the probability that ρ occurs as a prefix in the Main Execution; -let p ρ denote the probability that, conditioned on the prefix ρ occurring (in the Main Execution), the left-slot ψ i closes successfully in the Main Execution.
Take any ρ from ψ i . We claim that conditioned on ρ occurring, the expected value of poly(n) . This follows since, first, the hypothetical procedure starts rewinding the left-slot ψ i in iteration i only if this slot closes successfully in the Main Execution; hence, (conditioned on ρ occurring,) the probability the left-slot ψ i is rewound is at most p ρ . Second, once it starts rewinding the left-slot ψ i , it continues until the slot closes successfully again; since the hypothetical procedure proceeds identically in the rewindings as in the Main Execution, the probability that the left-slot ψ i closes successfully in any rewinding is also p ρ , and thus, (conditioned on ρ occurring,) the expected number of rewindings performed before this happens is 1/ p ρ . Therefore, the overall expected number of rewindings from ρ is p ρ × 
Running-Time Analysis of the Actual Extraction Procedure. Given that the expected running time of the hypothetical procedure is bounded by a polynomialT (n), it follows using the Markov inequality that, for every polynomial q 2 , (every b, every n ∈ N, and inputs v, z,) the probability that the hypothetical procedure takes more than q 2 (n)T (n)/2 steps is smaller than 2/q 2 (n). Then we claim that the probability that actual extraction procedure takes more than q 2 (n)T (n)/2 steps is smaller than 1/q 2 (n). This follows since the only difference between the hypothetical and the actual extraction procedures is that, in the former, the rewindings are simulated by committing to 0 m using com, whereas in the latter rewindings are simulated by committing to a tuple that contains a signature. Since the ZKAOK proof following the commitment is never rewound, it follows directly from the hiding property of com and the zero knowledge property of the ZKAOK proof that, the probability that the actual extraction procedure runs for more than q 2 (n)T (n)/2 steps differs from that of the hypothetical procedure by at most a negligible amount. Thus, for sufficiently large n, we have that the probability B spends more than T 2 (n) = q 2 (n)T (n)/2 steps is smaller than 1/q 2 (n).
Analysis of Part 3.
We show that the time that B spends in the Rewinding Phase is bounded by a polynomial T 3 (n) in expectation. It then follows by the Markov inequality that, for every polynomial q 3 , the probability that B takes more than q 3 (n)T 3 (n) steps is smaller than 1/q 3 (n).
It follows from the same argument as in the "running-time analysis of the hypothetical procedure" that to bound the expected time spent extracting the right committed value (also here, we consider the running-time without cut-offs), it suffices to bound the expected time spent in rewinding each right W ISSP proof, since the total number of right-proofs is poly(n). Then recall that a right-proof is rewound only if the proof completes successfully in the Main Execution, without interleaving with any message in Stage 1 or the ith proof of the left interaction. On the other hand, once the rewinding starts, it continues until this right-proof completes successfully again, while cancelling every rewinding in which the proof interleaves with any message in Stage 1 or the ith proof of the left interaction. Furthermore, as every rewinding is simulated exactly the same as in the Main Execution, it follows using the same " p times 1/ p argument" as in the analysis of part 2 that the expected number of rewindings for every right-proof is 1, and hence the expected time spent in extracting the right committed value is bounded by a polynomial T 3 (n).
PROOF OF CONCURRENT NONMALLEABILITY
Let us turn to proving that C, R is also concurrently nonmalleable. Recall that by Proposition 2.2, to show concurrent nonmalleability, it suffices to prove that C, R is one-many nonmalleable; that is, for every one-many man-in-the-middle adversary A, that participates in one left and many right interactions, the view of A and the values it commits to on the right are indistinguishable, no matter what value it is receiving a commitment to on the left. Towards this, we consider the same hybrid experiments H 0 to H k+6 as in the proof of stand-alone nonmalleability. It follows from almost the same proof as before that the view of A and the values it commits to on the right are indistinguishable in sequential hybrids, except that, in hybrids H 1 to H k+6 , we (or more precisely, the simulator B) now need to extract out the values that A commits to in all the right interactions (recall that the proof relies on the fact that the value that A commits to in the right interaction can be extracted "efficiently", to show the indistinguishability of hybrid H i and H i+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 6). This is easy to achieve, since we can simply extract the values that A commits to in each right interaction one by one, after the Main Execution completes. More precisely, in the Rewinding Phase, for every successful right interaction that has a different identity from the left interaction in the Main Execution, B finds a W ISSP proof in Stage 3 of this right interaction that does not interleave with any message in Stage 1 and the ith proof (or Stage 2 for hybrid H k+6 ) of that left interaction, and repeatedly rewinds the proof until a second transcript is obtain; it then computes a witness, if the two transcripts are different. Since there are only polynomial number of right interactions, it follows using almost the same proof of Lemma 6.4 that the running time of B is "bounded", and further using exactly the same proof of Lemma 6.5 that, except with negligible probability, the witnesses that B extracts out are indeed the values committed to in the right interactions. Thus, by the W I property of the Stage 3 proofs (or the hiding property of Stage 2 respectively), the view and the values committed to by A are indistinguishable in hybrids H i and H i+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 4 (or in H k+5 and H k+6 respectively). We thus have: THEOREM 7.1. C, R is concurrent nonmalleable.
PROOF OF ROBUST NONMALLEABILITY
In this section, we show that, for any r ∈ N, C, R can be easily modified into a O(r)-round (concurrent) non-malleable commitment scheme C ,R that is additionally one-many r-robust.
It is shown in that one-many r-robust commitment schemes are easy to construct: any commitment scheme that is "extractable" and has more than r "rewinding slots" is directly one-many nonmalleable with respect to r-round protocols. Therefore, to make our constant-round nonmalleable commitment scheme C, R onemany r-robust, we simply add more W ISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the protocol. More precisely, the commitment scheme C r , R r proceeds identically to C, R , except that in Stage 3 of the protocol, the CommitterC needs to provide max(r + 1, l) W ISSP proofs (of the statement that either the Stage 2 message is a valid commitment or that it knows a "trapdoor"), where l is the number of W ISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the original protocol C, R . It follows using the same proof as in that C r , R r is one-many r-robust. Roughly speaking, the main idea of the proof is to reduce the one-many r-robustness to the indistinguishability of the interaction with machine B(y 1 n ) or B(y 2 n ), by extracting the value committed to in the right interactions from the W ISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the protocol, without rewinding the left interactions. This is achievable, (similar to the proof of the indistinguishability of Hybrid H i and H i+1 in Section 6), as there are more W ISSP proofs in Stage 3 than the number of messages in the left interaction, and one can always find a W ISSP proof that does not interleave with the left interaction and extract a witness from this proof, without rewinding the left interactions. The witness extracted must be a valid decommitment, as otherwise, by the special-soundness of the proof, it must be a valid signature-chain, which violates the soundness of the signature-game (since the adversary here is never rewound and obtains only three signatures during the straight-line execution of the right interaction). Therefore, we conclude that C r , R r is one-many r-robust. It follows using the same proof in Section 6 that C r , R r is stand-alone nonmalleable; and it further follows using the same proof as in Section 7 that it is, in fact, also concurrent nonmalleable. -There is a PPT algorithm Gen, such that, for every n ∈ N, Gen(1 n ) outputs an i ∈ I. -There is a PPT algorithm Samp, such that, for every i ∈ I, Samp(i) samples an element from domain D i at random. -There is a PPT algorithm Eval, such that, for every x ∈ D i , Eval(i, x) outputs f i (x). -For every PPT machine A, there exists a negligible function μ, such that, for every n ∈ N,
A.2. Indistinguishability
Definition A.2 Computational Indistinguishability. Two ensembles {A n,y } n∈N,y∈Y n and {B n,y } n∈N,y∈Y n are said to be computationally indistinguishable (denoted by {A n,y } n∈N,y∈Y n ≈ {B n,y } n∈N,y∈Y n ), if for every PPT "distinguishing" machine D, there exists a negligible function ν(·) so that for every n ∈ N, y ∈ Y n :
A.3. Witness Relations
We recall the definition of a witness relation for a N P language [Goldreich 2001 ].
Definition A.3 Witness Relation. A witness relation for a language L ∈ N P is a binary relation R L that is polynomially bounded, polynomial time recognizable, and characterizes L by L = {x : ∃y s.t. (x, y) ∈ R L } We say that y is a witness for the membership x ∈ L if (x, y) ∈ R L . We will also let R L (x) denote the set of witnesses for the membership x ∈ L, that is, R L (x) = {y : (x, y) ∈ L}. In the following, we assume a fixed witness relation R L for each language L ∈ N P.
A.4. Interactive Proofs
We use the standard definitions of interactive proofs (and interactive Turing machines) [Goldwasser et al. 1989 ] and arguments (a.k.a. computationally sound proofs) [Brassard et al. 1988] . Given a pair of interactive Turing machines, P and V , we denote by P(w), V (x) the random variable representing the (local) output of V , on common input x, when interacting with machine P with private input w, when the random input to each machine is uniformly and independently chosen. In case the soundness condition is required to hold only with respect to a computationally bounded prover, the pair P, V is called an interactive argument system.
A.5. Zero-Knowledge
We recall the standard definition of Z K proofs. Loosely speaking, an interactive proof is said to be zero-knowledge (ZK) if a verifier V learns nothing beyond the validity of the assertion being proved, it could not have generated on its own. As "feasible" computation in general is defined though the notion of probabilistic polynomial-time, this notion is formalized by requiring that the output of every (possibly malicious) verifier interacting with the honest prover P can be "simulated" by a probabilistic expected polynomial-time machine S (a.k.a. the simulator). The idea behind this definition is that whatever V * might have learned from interacting with P, he could have learned by himself by running the simulator S.
The notion of ZK was introduced and formalized by Goldwasser et al. [1989] . We present their definition here.
Definition A.5 Z K. Let L be a language in NP, R L a witness relation for L, (P, V ) an interactive proof (argument) system for L. We say that (P, V ) is statistical/ computational Z K, if for every probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machine V there exists a probabilistic algorithm S whose expected running-time is polynomial in the length of its first input, such that the following ensembles are statistically close/computationally indistinguishable over L.
-{ P(y), V (z) (x)} n∈N,x∈{0,1} n ∩L,y∈R L (x),z∈{0,1} * , -{S(x, z)} n∈N,x∈{0,1} n ∩L,y∈R L (x),z∈{0,1} * , where P(y), V (z) (x) denotes the view of V in interaction with P on common input x and private inputs y and z, respectively.
A.6. Witness Indistinguishability
An interactive proof (or argument) is said to be witness indistinguishable (W I) if the verifier's output is "computationally independent" of the witness used by the prover for proving the statement. In this context, we focus on languages L ∈ N P with a corresponding witness relation R L . Namely, we consider interactions in which, on common input x, the prover is given a witness in R L (x). By saying that the output is computationally independent of the witness, we mean that for any two possible NP-witnesses that could be used by the prover to prove the statement x ∈ L, the corresponding outputs are computationally indistinguishable.
Definition A.6 Witness-Indistinguishability. Let P, V be an interactive proof (or argument) system for a language L ∈ N P. We say that P, V is witnessindistinguishable for R L , if for every probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machine V * and for every two sequences {w n,x ∈ R L (x) for every x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1} n , the following probability ensembles are computationally indistinguishable over n ∈ N.
-{ P(w 1 n,x ), V * (z) (x)} n∈N,x∈L∩{0,1} n ,z∈{0,1} * .
-{ P(w 2 n,x ), V * (z) (x)} n∈N,x∈L∩{0,1} n ,z∈{0,1} * .
A.7. Proofs (Arguments) of Knowledge
Loosely speaking, an interactive proof is a proof of knowledge if the prover convinces the verifier that it possesses, or can feasibly compute, a witness for the statement proved. The notion of a proof of knowledge is essentially formalized as follows: an interactive proof of x ∈ L is a proof of knowledge if there exists a probabilistic expected polynomialtime extractor machine E, such that for any prover P, E on input the description of P and any statement x ∈ L readily outputs a valid witness for x ∈ L if P succeeds in convincing the Verifier that x ∈ L. Formally, we have the following defination.
Definition A.7 Proof of Knowledge [Goldreich 2001] . Let (P, V ) be an interactive proof system for the language L. We say that (P, V ) is a proof of knowledge for the witness relation R L for the language L it there exists an probabilistic expected polynomialtime machine E, called the extractor, and a negligible function ν(n) such that for every machine P * , every statement x ∈ {0, 1} n , every random tape r ∈ {0, 1} * and every auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * , Pr P r (z), V (x) = 1 ≤ Pr E P r (x,z) (x) ∈ R L (x) + ν(n)
consider PPT provers. An interactive argument system P, V is an argument of knowledge if this condition holds with respect to probabilistic polynomial-time provers.
Special-Sound W I Proofs. A 4-round public-coin interactive proof for the language L ∈ N P with witness relation R L is special-sound with respect to R L , if for any two transcripts (δ, α, β, γ ) and (δ , α , β , γ ) such that the initial two messages, δ, δ and α, α , are the same but the challenges β, β are different, there is a deterministic procedure to extract the witness from the two transcripts and runs in polynomial time. Special-sound W I proofs for languages in N P can be based on the existence of 2-round commitment schemes, which in turn can be based on one-way functions [Goldreich et al. 1991; Feige and Shamir 1990; Håstad et al. 1999; Naor 1991] .
A.8. Signature Schemes
Signature schemes enables a sender or a signer to generate a digital signature for any message it wishes to authenticate, so that the signature can be universally verified as a certificate for the "authenticity" of the message. More precisely, we have the following definition.
Definition A.8. A signature scheme is a triplet (Gen, Sign, V er) of PPT algorithms satisfying the following conditions.
-On input 1 n , the key generation algorithm Gen outputs a pair of strings sk, pk ∈ {0, 1} * . vk is called the verification key and sk is called the signing key. -For every pair (sk, vk) in the range of Gen(1 n ), and for every α ∈ {0, 1} * , algorithm Sign and V er satisfy Pr [V er(vk, α, Sign(sk, α) 
We call Sign the signing algorithm and V er the verification algorithm. -For every PPT oracle machine A, there exists a negligible function μ, such that, for all n ∈ N, Pr (sk, vk) ← Gen(1 n ), (α, σ ) ← A Sign(sk, * ) (1 n ) :
V er(vk, α, σ ) = 1 ∧ α ∈ query (A Sign(sk, * ) (1 n )) ≤ μ(n).
In this work, we focus on signature schemes = (Gen, Sign, V er) that have fixedlength, that is, the signing algorithm Sign on input 1 n , a public key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , always outputs a signature of length n. We call such signature schemes fixed-length signature schemes.
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